State of Utah v. Cynthia Hinson and David Hinson : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
State of Utah v. Cynthia Hinson and David Hinson
: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dennis L. Judd; Rachelle L. Palmer; Daggett County Attorneys; Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
D. Bruce Oliver; D. Bruce Oliver, P.C.; Attorney for Defednants and Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Hinson, No. 970638 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1184




K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. °nOi*38-Cfr 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CYNTHIA HINSON and 
DAVID HINSON 
Defendants and Appellees, 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 970638-CA 
APPEAL 
Appeal for the Eighth District Court, Daggett County 
Judge John R. Anderson 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Appellees 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
(801) 328-8888 
Dennis L. Judd 
Rachelle L. Palmer 
Daggett County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
461 West 200 South 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-5359 
Argument Priority Classification = 15 FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAY 2 8 1998 
Julia DTUesaadro 
Clerk of the Court 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Mauahan v. Mauahan. 770 P.2d (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 2 
Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 2 
STATUTES 
Utah R. App. P. 33 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26 1 
Utah Code Annotated §77-18a-l (1995, Supp. 1997) . . . . . 1 
ii 
ARGUMENT 
The defendants are not entitled to attorney fees. Rule 33 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that there may be 
damages for delay or frivolous appeal, neither of those reasons 
exist in this case. Utah R, App P 33. 
The defendants allege this appeal by the State is frivolous. 
Rule 33 defines frivolous as "one that is not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, <>r reverse existing law." Utah R. 
App. P. 33. The appeal in this case is warranted on existing 
law. Both the Utah Code aii I the Utah Rules of CrirnInal Procedure 
allow the State to appeal from "a final judgment of dismissal." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) and Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-l (2) (a) 
(1995, Supp. 1997). The case law stated in the State's brief 
supports the propositions and positions set forth in the brief 
and the issues presented are grounded and warranted in that 
existing law. 
The judgment appealed from by the State Ilad not been 
litigated multiple times and the appeal was not sought for the 
purpose of delay. This is not a case where an issue Ilas been 
litigated over and over. The issue was an issue of first 
1 
impression in the district court. The State had and still has 
legitimate concerns with the existing law, the interpretation 
thereof, and the actions of the district court. 
Sanctions are not warranted in this case. The Utah Court of 
Appeals in the Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) case quoting Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 
1988) states that sanctions are only to be ordered in limited 
cases, "The ^sanction' for bringing a frivolous appeal is applied 
only in the egregious cases, *lest there be an improper chilling 
of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions." 770 
P.2d at 162. The court goes on to define egregious cases, 
"Egregious cases may include those obviously without merit, with 
no reasonable likelihood of success, and which result in the 
delay of a proper judgment." Id. Such is not the case here and 
the defendants have not alleged that this appeal is an egregious 
case. The defendants have not met the burden for an award of 
sanctions and this appeal does not warrant sanctions. The 
State's appeal is legitimate and not devoid of merit. An appeal 
may be unsuccessful but that does not mean that it is not worthy 
of consideration or that it should be subject to the sanctions of 
Rule 33. See generally Id. 
2 
CONCLUSION 
The State's appeal was and is not frivolous. The appeal is 
warranted by existing law. The Defendants are not entitled to 
attorney fees and costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of May, 1998. 
Daggett County Attorney 
Rachelle L. Palmer 
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R u l e 3 3 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 502 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's 
fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in 
a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award jus t damages, 
which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party The court may order that the 
damages be paid by the party or by the party's at torney 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the 
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, 
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time tha t will benefit 
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own 
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as par t of the 
appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the 
appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall 
issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why 
such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth 
the allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten 
days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The 
order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
Advisory Committee Note . — Rule 33 is 
substantially redrafted to provide definitions 
and procedures for assessing penalties for de-
lays and frivolous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court 
must award damages. This is in keeping with 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, the amount of damages — single or 
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to 
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended 





Frivolous appeal . 
A husband's appeal from a judgment relating 
to alimony and distribution of marital property 
was frivolous, where there was no basis for the 
argument presented and the evidence and law 
was mischaracterized and misstated. Eames v. 
Eames, 735 R2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Plaintiff's counsel violated rule and was 
therefore subject to sanction when, after he 
investigated plaintiff's malpractice action 
against defendant orthodontist and found that 
he could not prove breach of duty or causation, 
the record was devoid of any relevant, admissi-
impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and 
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). 
Under the law of these cases, appointed counsel 
must file an appeal and brief if requested by the 
defendant, and the court must find the appeal 
to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal. 
ble evidence showing negligence, and after los-
ing on summary judgment, he persisted in 
filing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 
(Utah 1990). 
An appeal brought from an action that was 
properly determined to be in bad faith is nec-
essarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Attorney who, after a case had been fully 
adjudicated, chose to ignore the decision and 
attempted to relitigate the same case violated 
Subdivision (a) of this rule and was therefore 
subject to sanctions. Schoney v. Memorial Es-
tates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
— Defined. 
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal 
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is one having no reasonable legal or factual C i ted in Barber v. Barber, 792 P2d 134 
basis. Lack of good faith is not required. (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hur t v. Hurt, 793 P2d 
O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 948 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Mahas v. 
1987). Rindlisbacher, 808 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1990); 
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd. p.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Mont Trucking, 
Partnership v. Hall, 751 P2d 1157 (Utah Ct. Inc. v. Ent rada Indus., Inc., 802 P.2d 779 (Utah 
App. 1988); Maughanv. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 c t . App. 1990); Ailred v. Allred, 807 P.2d 350 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Walters v. Walters, 812 
—Sanctions R 2 d 6 4 ( U t a h C t A p p ' 1 9 9 1 ) ; G r i f f i n v-
Sanctions for frivolous appeals should only Memmott, 814 P2d 601 (Utah Ct. App 1991); 
be applied in egregious cases to avoid chilling H i n c k 1 ^ v- " i n c k l e * * 1 5 ™ ^ 2 (Utah Ct. 
the right to appeal erroneous lower court deci- APP- 1 9 9 1 ) ' L a r s o n v- Overland Thrift & Loan, 
sions. However, sanctions should be imposed 8 1 8 R 2 d 1 3 1 6 ( U t a h C t - APP- 1 9 9 1 ) > Roberts v. 
when an appeal is obviously without any merit Roberts, 835 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
and has been taken with no reasonable likeli- H o l m v- Smilowitz, 840 P2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 
hood of prevailing. Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 1992); Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 845 P.2d 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan, 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry v. Cascade 
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Enters., 935 P2d 499 (Utah 1997). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate court to impose monetary sanctions on counsel 
Review §§ 918, 937. in absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 637. 789. 
AX.R. — Inherent power of federal district 
Rule 34. Award of costs . 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is 
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs 
shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, 
costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or 
taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state of 
Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the state 
shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or prohibited 
by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses on 
appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing party in 
the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or memoranda and 
attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in the 
preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of the reporter's 
transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for superse-
deas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees for filing and 
docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When costs are awarded to a party in 
an appeal, a party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is 
filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file with 
the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse 
party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of 
objection, together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial court. If 
there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time, the clerk of the 
trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party entitled 
thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with the 
same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost bill 
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justified. Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 
32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967). 
Good cause for delay. 
Defendant, who was charged at a time he had 
other case pending against him and in one of 
those cases requested and received psychiatric 
examination and who was appointed various 
counsel because of necessity and at his own 
request, was not denied right to speedy trial 
where he was held sane on August 14, 1969 and 
trial was initially set for January 7, 1970 and 
commenced on April 8, 1970, after disposition of 
defendant's motion to dismiss made on January 
7. State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136, 478 P.2d 
326(1970). 
Magistrate's authori ty to d ismiss . 
City court judge acting as a committing mag-
istrate upon a preliminary examination did not 
have authority to dismiss criminal proceedings. 
Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977). 
Offense improperly al leged. 
In prosecution for rape of female under 18 
years of age, where defendant was given pre-
liminary examination on complaint charging 
rape had been committed on April 1, and infor-
mation charged rape on that date, but proof 
showed that female was then over 18 years of 
age, and state promptly introduced evidence of 
prior acts of intercourse before female became 
18, conviction could not be upheld since defen-
dant was not given benefit of preliminary ex-
amination for offense for which he was con-
victed. State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 P. 1000 
(1909). 
Reasonableness of delay. 
Fact that information was not filed within 30 
days after defendant's commitment, did not 
entitle defendant to discharge, where good 
cause for delay was shown. State v. Reynolds, 
24 Utah 29, 66 P. 614(1901). 
Rev iew of b indover orders. 
A district court's jurisdiction over a motion to 
quash a bindover order follows from the autho-
rization in Subdivision (a) of dismissal of indict-
ments and informations. The motion focuses a 
district court's attention on the propriety of its 
exercise of original jurisdiction, requiring a 
determination of whether it can proceed with 
the case. The motion is not equivalent to an 
appeal. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 
1991). 
Statutes not in conflict. 
There was no conflict between statutes pro-
viding for dismissal of and bar to further pros-
ecutions against a sole defendant for misde-
meanors only and other statutes providing for 
dismissal of and bar to further prosecutions, 
whether felony or misdemeanor, against one of 
several joint defendants for purpose of allowing 
dismissed to be witness for the state. In re 
Petty, 18 Utah 2d 320, 422 P.2d 659 (1967). 
Subsequent prosecut ion. 
Where district court erroneously dismissed 
ordinance violation prosecution on appeal from 
city court but before arraignment and trial de 
novo in district court and that order of dis-
missal was later reversed by the Supreme 
Court, subsequent prosecution of defendant in 
district court for the ordinance violation was 
not "any other prosecution" within the bar of 
this section, it was merely the same prosecu-
tion which had never been begun de novo in the 
district court and thus was not barred. Boyer v. 
Larson, 20 Utah 2d 121, 433 P.2d 1015 U967). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§§ 512 to 519; 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§§ 859 to 875. 
C.J.S. — 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 610 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of statute 
authorizing dismissal of criminal action upon 
settlement of civil liability growing out of act 
charged, 42 A.L.R.3d 315. 
Propriety of court's dismissing indictment or 
prosecution because of failure of jury to agree 
after successive trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274. 
What constitutes "manifest necessity" for 
state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing 
subsequent trial despite jeopardy's having at-
tached, 14A.L.R.4th 1014. 
When does delay in imposing sentence vio-
late speedy trial provision, 86 A.L.R.4th 340. 
Rule 26. Appeals . 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, s tat ing the order or judgment appealed 
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record. 
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the 
defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate court 
decides tha t the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 436 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony informa-
tion following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence 
when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides that the appeal 
would be in the interest of justice; 
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a final order under subsection 
(3)(a), a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as charged or a 
pretrial order dismissing or quashing in part a felony information, when upon 
a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal would be in the 
interest of justice; or 
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest. 
(4)(a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or arrest of 
judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the motion is 
given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice shall be filed with 
the court. 
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in taking it, 
or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant. The 
dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another appeal may be, 
and is, timely taken. 
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the 
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails 
to appear for oral argument. 
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals 
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided. 
(8)(a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the sentence 
of death has been imposed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 days of the 
filing of the record on appeal. Respondent briefs shall be filed within 60 days 
of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be raised on appeal shall be 
included by each party in its appellate brief. Appellant reply briefs shall be 
filed within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's brief. 
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be granted to each 
party, but only upon application to the Supreme Court showing extraordinary 
circumstances warranting an extension. 
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral arguments of the case to be 
heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the final brief. Following 
oral arguments, the case shall be placed first on the Supreme Court's calendar, 
for expeditious determination. 
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a subsequent appeal of a 
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be 
entertained by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be 
granted, when the appeal does not raise any new matter not previously 
resolved or when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal. 
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(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and the 
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically 
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the 
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by the 
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has 
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the 
Supreme Court. 
(11) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, 
as is appropriate, from all final orders and judgments rendered in a district 
court or juvenile court under this rule. 
(12) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered 
in the justice court under this rule, except: 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the district court. The decision of the 
district court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a statute 
or ordinance is raised in the justice court; 
(b) within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court shall 
transmit to the district court a certified copy of the docket, the original 
pleadings, all notices, motions, and other papers filed in the case, and the 
notice and undertaking on appeal; 
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal are under Rule 27, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; or 
(d) all further proceedings are in the district court, including any process 
required to enforce judgment. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1996; April 1, 1998.) 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend-
ment deleted former Subdivision 111), relating 
to procedure in appeals from circuit courts; 
redesignated former Subdivisions (12) and (13) 
as (11) and (12); substituted "district court" for 
"circuit court" throughout Subdivision (12); and 
substituted "Criminal Procedure" for "Court 
Procedure" in Subdivision (12)(c). 
The 1998 amendment added the inclusive 
language at the end of Subdivision (3)(a) and 
added Subdivision (3)(f), renumbering accord-
ingly. 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule governs ap-
peals from district and juvenile courts. The 
practice and procedure for taking such appeals, 
including the time in which the appeal is filed, 
are prescribed by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Cross References . — Appeals from justice 
court to district court, § 78-5-120. 
Appeals to Court of Appeals, $ 78-4-11. 
Appellate jurisdiction of district courts, Utah 
Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4. 
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, 
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3; § 78-2-2. 
Dismissal if affidavit of impecuniosity is un-
true, § 21-7-7. 
Judicial Council, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 
12. 
Right of defendant to appeal, Utah Const., 
Art. I, Sec. 12; § 77-1-6. 
Right of indigent accused to counsel on ap-
peal, § 77-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Appeal by defendant. 
Appeal by prosecution. 
—Dismissals. 
Appealability. 
Applicability of civil rules. 
—Court findings. 
Attorney's failure to file notice. 
Bind over orders. 
Death penalty cases. 
Double jeopardy. 
Finality. 
Habeas corpus ruling. 
Justice court. 
Notice of appeal. 
Oral statements from bench. 
Reversal of order arresting judgment. 
Review of acquittal prohibited. 
Review of evidence. 
Time for appeal. 
Cited. 
Appeal by defendant . 
A purported second judgment and sentence, 
which was clearly an attempt to render a judg-
ment in criminal proceeding which if valid 
would have affected defendant's rights, was 
appealable. State v. Alexander, 15 Utah 2d 14, 
386 P.2d 411 (1963). 
Denial of motion to dismiss on double jeop-
ardy grounds is a "final" judgment; rights pro-
tected by the double jeopardy guarantee neces-
sitate review on appeal before a second trial if 




77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
77-18a-l, Appeals — When proper. 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony 
information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) an order arrest ing judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence 
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal 
would be in the interest of justice; 
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a final order under subsec-
tion (2)(a), a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as 
charged or a pretrial order dismissing or quashing in part a felony 
information, when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides 
that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l, enacted by L. beginning "including a dismissal" to Subsection 
1990, ch. 7, § 10; 1995, ch. 65, $ 1; 1997, ch. (2)(a). 
364, § 1. The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend- added Subsection <2>(f) and made related sty-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added the phrase listic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Dismissal." cause to bind the defendant over for trial was "a 
A preliminary-hearing magistrate's order final judgment of dismissal" and the state was 
dismissing a felony information and discharg- entitled to appeal. State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53 
ing the defendant based on the magistrate's (Utah 1994). 
conclusion that there was insufficient probable 
